Singapore continues to adopt a strongly pro-enforcement approach to foreign arbitral awards, with resistance permitted only in exceptional circumstances. A recent decision of the Singapore International Commercial Court illustrates how this high threshold operates in practice, showing that while enforcement will ordinarily be upheld, the courts remain prepared to intervene only where a genuine breach of natural justice results in practical injustice.
Foreign arbitral awards are generally recognised and enforceable in Singapore under Part III of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">International Arbitration Act 1994 (2020 Rev Ed)</span> (“<span class="news-text_medium">IAA</span>”). The statutory grounds upon which enforcement may be resisted are narrowly defined and exhaustively set out in section 31 of the IAA. The Singapore courts have consistently reaffirmed a policy of minimal curial intervention in arbitral proceedings, grounded in party autonomy and the principle of finality. This approach has been emphasised at the highest level, including in <span class="news-text_italic-underline">COT v COU and another [2023] SGCA 31</span>.
In line with this policy, Singapore courts are highly reluctant to revisit the merits of an arbitral award and interpret the grounds for resisting enforcement strictly. Empirical data reflects this stance: over the past two decades, only around 20% of applications to set aside foreign arbitral awards have succeeded. This demonstrate that successful challenges to enforcement remain rare, underscoring Singapore’s reputation as an enforcement‑friendly jurisdiction.
An illustration of the circumstances in which the high bar for resisting enforcement might be satisfied is found in <span class="news-text_italic-underline">GNC Holdings LLC v ONI Global Pte Ltd and another [2025] SGHC(I) 25</span>, where the Singapore International Commercial Court (the “<span class="news-text_medium">SICC</span>”) partially refused enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. The dispute arose out of multiple franchise agreements between GNC Holdings LLC (the “<span class="news-text_medium">franchisor</span>”) and ONI Global Pte Ltd together with LAC Global (Singapore) Pte Ltd (the “<span class="news-text_medium">franchisees</span>”).
The franchisees alleged serious contractual breaches by the franchisor and claimed that they were entitled to terminate the agreements. The franchisor, by contrast, asserted that the terminations were wrongful and that the franchisees had failed to perform their obligations. The matter was referred to arbitration. The tribunal dismissed the franchisees’ claims and issued a final award that included an order for specific performance, described by the SICC as “<span class="news-text_medium">Order 3”</span>.
This order comprised several distinct obligations. Enforcement of the award was initially granted in Singapore on an ex parte basis. The franchisees applied to set aside the enforcement order, arguing in particular that Order 3 should not be enforced because it would amount to a breach of natural justice. Their central complaint was that the tribunal had ordered specific performance without hearing submissions from the parties on whether such relief should be granted.
The SICC accepted this argument only in part. It agreed that the tribunal had not invited or considered submissions on the issue of specific performance before making the order. However, the Court did not set aside enforcement of Order 3 in its entirety. Instead, it refused enforcement only in respect of one paragraph and two sub-paragraphs of Order 3 (the “<span class="news-text_medium">Three Paragraphs</span>”), while allowing the remainder to stand.
In reaching this conclusion, the SICC distinguished between those parts of Order 3 that reflected post-termination obligations arising naturally under the franchise agreements and the directions contained in the Three Paragraphs. For most of Order 3, the Court found that the absence of submissions caused no practical injustice. By contrast, there was a real possibility that arguments against the Three Paragraphs might have succeeded had they been heard, establishing a breach of natural justice in respect of those provisions.
The Court also rejected the franchisor’s argument that the specific performance order was indivisible. It held that removing the Three Paragraphs did not materially alter the meaning or effect of the remainder of the order.
Although <span class="news-text_italic-underline">GNC Holdings</span> did not result in a complete refusal to enforce the award, it provides important guidance on how Singapore courts approach natural justice challenges at the enforcement stage. The decision confirms that, while Singapore remains firmly pro-enforcement, the courts will intervene where a real breach of the right to be heard has caused practical injustice. The SICC’s analysis involved a limited consideration of the substance of the tribunal’s decision, but only to assess whether the outcome might realistically have been different had submissions been heard.
The Court did not review the award for errors of law or fact, nor did it treat itself as an appellate body over the tribunal. Instead, “practical injustice” remained the decisive touchstone. Overall, the decision demonstrates the careful balance struck by Singapore courts: robust support for enforcement of arbitral awards, coupled with a principled willingness to safeguard procedural fairness where the stringent statutory threshold is genuinely met.
